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EVIDENTIARY PROOF IN EXPATRIATION PROCEEDINGS
Vance v. Terrazas
444 U.S. 252 (1980)
Vance v. Terrazas' is the most recent case in a series of expatria-
tion decisions2 handed down by the United States Supreme Court. In
this 1980 decision, the Court examined for the first time the constitu-
tionality of congressionally-set standards of evidentiary proof necessary
to establish whether a citizen has expatriated himself.
3
Prior to Terrazas, few expatriation cases addressed issues relating
to the appropriate burden of proof. Two early cases4 considered the
burden of proof and determined that a clear and convincing standard
was required. In 1961, however, Congress amended the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 to include a provision on evidentiary
proofi The statute now provides that the Government must prove loss
of nationality by a preponderance of the evidence.6 The clause further
provides that acts of expatriation are presumed to have been committed
voluntarily, but that the presumption may be rebutted on a showing, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the act was committed involunta-
rily.
7
The Court in Terrazas concluded that Congress has the power to
I. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
2. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Nishikawa v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44
(1958); Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955); Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950);
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). For a discussion of the distinction between expatriation
and denaturalization, see note 142 infra.
3. Although loss of nationality is normally an administrative determination made by the
Department of State, the decision is based on evidence pertaining to whether the citizen intended
to relinquish his citizenship and to whether he committed an act which is deemed an act of expa-
triation. See text accompanying notes 17-21 infra.
4. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act of 19521.
6. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 19, 75 Stat. 656 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c)
(1976)). This section provides:
Whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in any action or proceeding
commenced on or after September 26, 1961. . .the burden shall be upon the person or
party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such claim by a preponderance of the
evidence. . . [Any person who commits or performs, or who has committed or per-
formed, any act of expatriation under the provisions of this chapter. . .shall be pre-
sumed to have done so voluntarily, but such presumption may be rebutted upon a
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the act or acts committed or per-
formed were not done voluntarily.
7. Id.
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determine evidentiary standards in expatriation decisions. 8 The Court
also considered, and upheld, the constitutionality of the statutory evi-
dentiary provision. In addition to the proof necessary under the con-
gressional provision, the Court imposed a further requirement that the
Government establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a citizen
intended to commit the expatriating act. However, because the Court
declined to find a liberty interest in citizenship, there was no procedural
due process analysis of whether a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard in expatriation proceedings affords adequate due process to the
citizen.
This comment will briefly review the development of the immigra-
tion and nationality acts. It will then survey the Supreme Court case
law on expatriation. The Terrazas case will be presented with an anal-
ysis of the reasoning of the Supreme Court on the issue of the appropri-
ate burden of proof. This comment will conclude that the Court too
narrowly viewed the concept of liberty with respect to citizenship and
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires proof
of expatriation by clear and convincing evidence.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Development of Statutory Expatriation Law
In 1907, Congress first codified expatriation law.9 The first statute,
the Expatriation Act of 1907,'° described two conditions under which a
United States citizen would be deemed to have expatriated himself.
8. This comment will address only the issue in Terrazas of whether a preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof mandated by Congress is constitutional.
9. Prior to the Expatriation Act of 1907, the earliest forms of expatriation law in the United
States were treaties with foreign nations. Roche, The Loss ofAmerican Nationality-The Develop-
ment of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 25 (1950) [hereinafter referred to as Roche].
The treaties did not incorporate substantive and procedural guidelines for expatriation proceed-
ings nor were they consistent with each other. Two types of treaties in the mid-nineteenth century
were the Naturalization Convention of 1870 with Great Britain and the Bancroft Treaties with the
German States. The former acknowledged that United States citizenship was lost following an
individual's naturalization in a foreign state. Alternatively, the Bancroft Treaties authorized loss
of citizenship, and in some situations mandated the relinquishment of citizenship following, natu-
ralization in a foreign state. Id.
There is a question whether the Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 490, or the Act of 1868, 15 Stat.
223, was actually the statutory source of present day expatriation law. The statute enacted in 1865
provided that those who deserted the armed forces relinquished their "rights of citizenship."
"Rights of citizenship" were not clearly defined within that Act. The Act of 1868 defined "right of
expatriation" and provided that, "any declaration, instruction, opinion, order or decision of any
officer of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is
hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government." See generally
Ekins, Expatriation after Terrazas v. Vance." Right or Retribution? 19 VA. J. INT'L LAW 107, 110-11
(1978); Roche, supra, at 26; Note, Expatriation Legislation, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 95 (1968).
10. Ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907) [hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1907].
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The statute provided that an individual relinquished his citizenship
when he had "been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with
its laws, or when he had taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign
state."" A second provision stated that a naturalized citizen expatri-
ated himself when he had "resided for two years in the foreign state
from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state."' 12 The
presumptions of residence embodied in the statute were rebuttable,
however, on the presentation of evidence to a United States diplomatic
or consular office.13
The Nationality Act of 1940,14 which replaced the Act of 1907,
expanded the list of actions by which an individual would lose his na-
tionality. The additional actions included serving in foreign armed
forces, performing duties or being employed by a foreign government,
voting in a political election in a foreign state, making a formal renun-
ciation of nationality, deserting the military or naval service in time of
war or committing an act of treason.'5 The Act of 1940, however, alto-
gether eliminated the clause providing for a rebuttable presumption of
residence for naturalized citizens who have resided in foreign states.16
The current statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952,17 became effective on June 27, 1952.18 Although this statute is
more comprehensive than its earlier counterparts, it describes a series
of actions resulting in expatriation which closely resembles that con-
tained in the Act of 1940. In 1961, the statute was amended by the
addition of a provision setting forth standards of evidentiary proof.19
The clause states that when loss of nationality is at issue, the Govern-
11. Id. § 2, 34 Stat. 1229.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Ch. 4, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168 (1940) [hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1940].
15. Id. §§ 401(a)-(h), 54 Stat. 1168-69. Remaining sections of the Act provide guidelines
limiting an individual's ability to expatriate himself and provisions relating to parents' loss of
nationality upon minors residing abroad. id. §§ 402-410, 54 Stat. 1169-71.
16. The Act of 1940 provided that a citizen who was subject to the presumptions prior to the
effective date of the Act of 1940 should be allowed a period of one year following the approval of
the Act to overcome the presumption. The elimination of the rebuttable presumption was the
result of Attorney General Wickersham's interpretation of the statute. He contended that since
the presumption was included to relieve the State Department of the obligation to protect citizens
abroad, it had little relevance to loss of citizenship. Roche, supra note 9, at 38-39.
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1976).
18. Subsequent amendments to the Act were as follows: Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1256, § 2, 68
Stat. 1146 (1954); Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 19, 75 Stat. 656 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 148 1(c) (1976)). For a discussion of amendments, see Dixon, Immigration and Nationality Law,
ANN. SUR VE Y AM. L. 679- 99 (1978); Harris, The Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1976."
Implicationsfor the Alien Professional, 26 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 295-324 (1977).
19. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 19,75 Stat. 656 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c)
(1976)).
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ment shall have the burden of establishing loss of nationality by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 20 The clause also provides that the
expatriating act is presumed to have been committed voluntarily, and
the person performing the act shall be allowed to rebut the presump-
tion by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was
involuntarily performed.
21
Expatriation Law Prior to Vance v. Terrazas
Expatriation case law has developed in the Supreme Court prima-
rily through a series of seven cases. 22 The first case, Gonzales v. Lan-
don,23 was decided in 1955. In Gonzales, an expatriation proceeding
was brought against the plaintiff for remaining outside of the jurisdic-
tion of the United States during time of war for the purpose of avoiding
the draft. In a per curiam decision, the Court held that a clear and
convincing standard of proof was required in expatriation cases which
arose under section 4010) of the Act of 1940.24
The next three decisions were handed down on March 31, 1958.25
In Perez v. Brownell,26 the Government claimed that the plaintiff, an
American citizen, had lost his citizenship under the Act of 1940 by vot-
ing in a Mexican political election and by remaining outside of the
United States during time of war in order to avoid the draft.27 The
Court found it necessary to address the source of Congress' power to
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S.
920 (1955). This discussion does not include two earlier cases, Savorgnan v. United States, 338
U.S. 491 (1950), and Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), since these decisions added little to
the development of expatriation law.
23. 350 U.S. 920 (1955).
24. Id. The Court applied this evidentiary standard since it was the same standard used in
denaturalization cases. Id. See note 27 infra for the text of § 401() of the Act of 1940.
25. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
26. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
27. Id. at 46-47. Sections 401(e) and (j) of the Act of 1940 provided that a person shall lose
his nationality by:
(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.
(j) Departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in time
of war or during a period declared by the President to be a period of national emergency
for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the land or naval forces of
the United States.
Section 4010) was added to the Act of 1940 by the Act of Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 418, § 401(j), 58 Stat.
746 (1944).
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enact legislation to regulate foreign affairs. 28 It found such power "in-
herent" and stated that there was an inference from the Act of 1940
that Congress had inherent power to regulate foreign affairs by making
voting in foreign elections an act of expatriation.
2 9
The Court determined that Congress had the authority to expatri-
ate an individual for voting in a foreign election, 30 stating that there
need only be a "rational nexus" between the source of congressional
power and the act of effectuating that power.3' The Court found this
"rational nexus" satisfied in Perez since the withdrawal of citizenship
was reasonably related to the regulation of foreign affairs.32 The Court
further held that Congress' power to withdraw citizenship can be exer-
cised only when an expatriating act has been engaged in voluntarily,
33
but added that "it would be a mockery of this Court's decisions to sug-
gest that a person, in order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire
to do so."
34
The dissenting opinion in Perez, written by Chief Justice Warren,
voiced the objection of three dissenting justices3 5 to traditional congres-
sional power over citizenship. They contended that citizenship is too
valuable a right to be subjected to congressional whim. Justice Warren
stated:
Whatever may be the scope of its powers to regulate the conduct and
affairs of all persons within its jurisdiction, a government of the peo-
ple cannot take away their citizenship simply because one branch of
that &overnment can be said to have a conceivably rational basis for
wanting to do so.
36
Justice Warren emphasized the extreme importance of citizenship
rights noting that "citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less
28. 356 U.S. at 57. The Court reasoned that although the Constitution does not specifically
grant Congress this power, the states in creating a federal government must have granted that
government the "powers indispensable to its functioning effectively in the company of sovereign
nations." Id.
29. Id. at 57. The Court reasoned that voting in such elections might give rise to interna-
tional embarrassment. Id. at 59.
30. In light of its earlier decision with respect to voting rights under the Act of 1940, the
Court found it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the portion of § 4010) which dealt
with draft evasion. Id. at 62.
31. Id. at 58.
32. Id. at 60.
33. Id. at 61.
34. Id. Prior decisions to which the Court was referring include Savorgnan v. United States,
338 U.S. 491 (1950), and Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), which upheld loss of citizenship
despite the plaintiffs lack of intention in both cases to renounce allegiance to the United States.
35. Justices Black and Douglas joined in Chief Justice Warren's dissent. 356 U.S. at 62.
Justice Whittaker dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 84.
36. Id. at 65. (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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than the right to have rights."'3 7 He concluded that Perez had not expa-
triated himself by having voted in the Mexican election. Although
recognizing that citizenship can be lost by voluntary conduct, Justice
Warren reasoned that expatriating conduct must invariably involve a
dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to show a voluntary aban-
donment of citizenship.
38
In Trop v. Dulles,3 9 decided the same day as Perez, the Court faced
the issue of whether an individual could lose his citizenship for having
been convicted and sentenced for desertion from the armed forces dur-
ing time of war.4° Justice Warren, announcing the decision of the
Court, reiterated the thrust of his Perez dissent noting that citizenship
cannot be divested merely through the exercise of the general powers of
the government. He added that there must be a showing that the indi-
vidual voluntarily relinquished his citizenship by express language or
conduct or from language from which renunciation could be inferred,
and that neither existed as to Trop.
4 1
Nishikawa v. Dulles42 was the third case decided on March 31,
1958. The Court distinguished Nishikawa from Perez and Trop by not-
ing that the latter decisions had involved the constitutionality of sec-
tions 401 (e) and 401 (g) of the Act of 1940,43 whereas in Nishikawa, the
sole concern was the burden of proof.
The plaintiff in Nishikawa was born in the United States of Japa-
nese parents. He was a United States citizen but was also considered a
citizen of Japan due to his parents' Japanese citizenship. 44 After receiv-
ing a college degree in the United States, he went to Japan to visit and
study but was inducted into the Japanese army and served as a
mechanic while the United States was at war with Japan. 45 Following
the war, the plaintiff applied for an American passport, but instead was
37. Id. at 64. (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 75. (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
39. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
40. Section 401(g) of the Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(g), 54 Stat. 1169 (1940), as amended by
Act of Jan. 20, 1944, ch. 2, 58 Stat. 4 (1944), stated that a person, shall lose his nationality by:
Deserting the military or naval forces of the United States in time of war, provided he is
convicted thereof by court martial and as the result of such conviction is dismissed or
dishonorably discharged from the service of such military or naval forces ...
41. 356 U.S. at 92-93. The majority further found that expatriation under § 401(g) of the Act
of 1940 was cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment and,
therefore, held the law unconstitutional.
42. 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
43. See note 27 supra for the text of § 401(e) of the Act of 1940 and note 40 supra for the text
of § 401(g) of the Act of 1940.
44. 356 U.S. at 131.
45. Id.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality.46 The plaintiff then brought
an action for a declaration of United States citizenship.
Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, addressed the issue of the
required standard of proof in expatriation cases. He declared that
whether an individual acquires citizenship at birth or through naturali-
zation, the burden is on the Government to show expatriation by clear
and convincing evidence.47 He reached this conclusion by relying on
Gonzales v. Landon. Justice Warren went further than Gonzales, which
had addressed just one provision of the 1940 statute, by extending the
evidentiary standard to all sections of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.4 8 Furthermore, the Court found that because the consequences of
loss of citizenship are so drastic, the Government also has the burden
of proving by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that the ex-
patriating act was performed voluntarily.
49
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez50 and Schneider v. Rusk 5 were the
next Supreme Court cases to resolve expatriation questions. In both
cases the Court invalidated sections of the Act of 1952, which declared
that a citizen shall lose his nationality for leaving or remaining outside
of the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war and for continu-
ally residing for three years in the foreign state of which he was for-
merly a national or in which he had been born. In both instances, the
Court concluded that the withdrawal of citizenship was a deprivation
of due process of law.
5 2
The last case which substantially contributed to the development
of expatriation case law was Afroyim v. Rusk,53 decided in 1967. 54 In
46. Id.
47. Id. at 133.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 134. The Court concluded that the Government had not sustained the burden by
clear, convincing and unequivocal proof.
50. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
51. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
52. In Kennedy, the Supreme Court declared § 349(a)(10) of the Act of 1952 unconstitutional.
The section had stated that a citizen shall lose his nationality for leaving or remaining outside of
the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war, on the grounds that the provision acted as a
"punishment" and would, therefore, deprive the plaintiffs of citizenship without due process of
law. 372 U.S. at 165-66. In Schneider, the plaintiff was a German immigrant who subsequently
became a naturalized United States citizen. She later returned to Germany to live with her hus-
band. After a prolonged absence from the United States, the plaintiff was denied a passport. 377
U.S. at 163-64. The Court declared § 352(a)(1) of the Act of 1952, which provided for the loss of
citizenship of a naturalized citizen who continually resides for three years in the foreign state of
which he was formerly a national or in which he had been born, unconstitutional. The Court
found that the section was discriminatory and violative of due process in that it placed restrictions
on naturalized citizens which were not placed on native-born citizens. Id. at 168.
53. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
54. FollowingAfroyim, one other case, Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), challenged the
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Afroyim, the Court overruled its holding in Perez v. Brownell,55 recog-
nizing that since Perez it had consistently invalidated other sections of
the Immigration and Nationality Act which provided for involuntary
loss of citizenship. 56 Writing for the majority, Justice Black rejected
the Perez notion that Congress has a general power to take away citi-
zenship without the citizen's "assent. ' 57 The Court stated that this
power, in contradistinction to the reasoning in Perez, is not an implied
attribute of sovereignty. 58 The majority emphasized that the Constitu-
tion limits congressional powers to those specifically enumerated or
those necessary or proper to carry out the express powers.59 It con-
cluded that the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress power
to remove citizenship rights, nor can Congress do so through its im-
plied power to regulate foreign affairs.60 The Court held that under the
fourteenth amendment every citizen by way of birth or naturalization is
protected against congressionally-mandated forcible destruction of his
right of citizenship whatever his creed, color or race; he does not relin-
quish that right unless he does so voluntarily.
6'
The cases from Gonzales to Afroyim reflect the state of expatria-
tion law at the time the Supreme Court decided Vance v. Terrazas. The
decisions show that the Court has been careful to limit the role of Con-
gress in expatriation. Furthermore, the decisions indicate the Court's
emphasis on the significance of citizenship. This is evidenced by the
constitutionality of a section of the Act of 1952. The principles developed in Afroyim and Schnei-
der were not applied by the Court since the case was distinguished on its facts. 401 U.S. at 818-19.
The plaintiff in Rogers lost his citizenship for failing to comply with the residence requirements of
§ 301(b) of the Act of 1952. Section 301(b) provides that an individual born abroad who acquires
citizenship because one of his parents is a United States citizen, loses his citizenship rights if he
fails to reside in the United States for five years between the ages of 14 and 28.
Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion of the Court, concluded that the plaintiff, born
outside of the United States, was not a citizen within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment,
which applies to "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." The Court distinguished
Afroyim and Schneider by observing that in those cases the plaintiffs had resided in the United
States and had acquired citizenship by the naturalization process. The Court thus concluded that
Bellei's claim to citizenship was subject to congressional regulation and was "wholly, and, only
statutory." Id. at 833. The dissenting justices, including Justice Black who had written the
Afroyim majority opinion, contended that the fourteenth amendment principles announced in
Afroyim applied to all citizens of the United States whether or not they were naturalized in the
United States or acquired citizenship abroad. The dissent suggested that the Court in making this
distinction had, in effect, overruled its holding in Afroyim, Id. at 837.
55. See text accompanying notes 26-38 supra.
56. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).




61. Id. at 268.
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Court's holdings that expatriating acts must be performed voluntarily




Laurence J. Terrazas was born in Takoma Park, Maryland in
1947.62 At that time, his mother was a citizen of the United States and
his father a citizen of Mexico. 63 As a result of his parents' citizenship,
Terrazas acquired dual nationality under the laws of Mexico and the
fourteenth amendment. 64
In 1970, while Terrazas was a student at the Colegio Comercial
Ingles in Monterrey, Mexico,65 he signed an application for a Certifi-
cate of Mexican Nationality to serve as evidence of his Mexican citizen-
ship.66 He claimed he had been told by a college official that
completion of the certificate was a requirement for graduation.67 In
signing the application, Terrazas expressly renounced his United States
citizenship and all loyalty and obedience to "North America," and
swore adherence, obedience and submission to the Mexican Repub-
lic. 68 Terrazas claimed that when he signed the application, none of the
blanks containing the words "United States" and "North America"
were filled in. He also insisted that he did not know that he was relin-
quishing his United States citizenship.
69
Several months after receiving a Certificate of Mexican National-
62. Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7, 7 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
63. Id. The plaintiffs father was a Mexican diplomat, a former Lieutenant Governor of the
State of Chihuahua, Mexico and a hero of the revolution. Brief for Appellant at 4.
64. The fourteenth amendment states that:
All persons born... in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States. . . . U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
65. The plaintiff originally attended the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus. As a
result of academic difficulties, the plaintiff enrolled in the Colegio Comercial Ingles in 1968, where
all courses were conducted in Spanish. Brief for Appellee at 3.
66. 577 F.2d at 8.
67. Id. at 7.
68. The application was written in Spanish and contained a paragraph which, translated into
English, provided as follows:
I therefore hereby expressly renounce - citizenship, as well as any submission,
obedience, and loyalty to my foreign government, especially to that of _ , of
which I might have been subject, all protection foreign to the laws and authorities of
Mexico, all rights which treaties or international law grant to foreigners; and further-
more I swear adherence, obedience, and submission to the law and authorities of the
Mexican Republic.
Id. at 8. The blanks were filled in with the words "United States" and "North America," respec-
tively.
69. Id. The plaintiff's father instructed him to sign the application. When the plaintiff in-
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ity, Terrazas went to the United States Consulate in Monterrey to de-
termine whether the certificate had affected the status of his United
States citizenship.70 He was told by a consular officer that by having
acquired the certificate he had probably expatriated himself.7' The of-
ficer explained that for a final determination of the status of his United
States citizenship he should file the appropriate forms with the Depart-
ment of State.
72
In December, 197 1, the United States Department of State issued a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality. 73 Terrazas appealed the issuance of
this certificate before the Board of Appellate Review of the Department
of State and requested issuance of a passport. 74 In April, 1975, the
Board affirmed the prior administrative decision and denied Terrazas'
application for a passport.75 Terrazas brought an action against Secre-
tary of State Cyrus Vance seeking issuance of a passport and a declara-
tion of United States nationality.
76
Procedure in the Courts
On August 16, 1977, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois denied Terrazas' claim for relief.77 In
reaching its decision, the court applied the evidentiary standards of the
Act of 1952.78 The district court found that the United States had
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Terrazas had relin-
quished his United States citizenship. 79 Furthermore, the court found
that Terrazas had failed to rebut sufficiently the presumption of volun-
quired as to the meaning of the document, the plaintiff claimed that his father replied, "[d]on't
worry about it. Don't argue with me. Just sign it." Brief for Appellee at 5 n.4.
70. 577 F.2d at 8.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 9. It is uncertain whether Terrazas knew he was applying for a Certificate of Loss
of Nationality at the time he was filling out the documents supplied by the consulate officer. The
procedure had been explained to him as a determination of whether he had relinquished his
United States citizenship. Id. at 9 n.7.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Terrazas brought his action under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(c) (1976), which provides that:
A person who has been issued a certificate of identity under the provisions of subsection
(b) of this section, and while in possession thereof, may apply for admission to the
United States at any port of entry, and shall be subject to all the provisions of this chap-
ter relating to the conduct of proceedings involving aliens seeking admission to the
United States. A final determination by the Attorney General that any such person is
not entitled to admission to the United States shall be subject to review by any court of
competent jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. ...
77. The findings of the district court were issued in an unreported memorandum decision.
Terrazas v. Vance, No. 75 C 2370 (N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 16, 1977).
78. See note 5 supra.
79. No. 75 C 2370, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 1977).
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tariness. 80 The district court concluded that in signing the Certificate of
Mexican Nationality, Terrazas had knowingly and voluntarily acted to
renounce allegiance to the United States and to swear obedience to the
Mexican Republic.
8 l
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court's holding and remanded the case for further
proceedings,82 concluding that a clear and convincing standard of
proof was constitutionally required.8 3 It stated three reasons for its de-
cision. First, the court noted that a clear and convincing test had been
adopted by the Court in Nishikawa v. Dulles8 4 prior to the 1961 amend-
ment to the Act of 1952 which set out, as a statutory matter, a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard.85 Second, the Seventh Circuit noted
that most lower court decisions decided after Afroyim also had applied
the clear and convincing standard in expatriation cases.86 Finally, the
court concluded that a clear and convincing standard better reflects the
importance of the citizenship interest which the United States attempts
to protect.8 7 The court stated that clear and convincing proof would be
the "minimum burden of proof necessary to guarantee the adequate
protection of an individual's citizenship."
8 8
The United States Supreme Court decided the case on appeal on
January 15, 1980. The Court first considered the contention of the Sec-
retary of State that it was unnecessary for the Government to prove
specific intent to relinquish citizenship.8 9 The Court relied on Afroyim
v. Rusk 90 in rejecting this contention. It noted that Afroyim had over-
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 8-9.
82. 577 F.2d at 12.
83. Id. at 1I. In addition to discussing the appropriate burden of proof, the court held that
Congress does not have the power to determine the standard of proof in expatriation decisions.
The court stated that by adopting the burden of proof that Congress had imposed through
§ 1481(c), it would be indirectly granting Congress power which the Supreme Court in Afroyim
had refused to sanction. Id. at 10. Intent was not specifically discussed by the court of appeals.
Nevertheless, the court indicated in its discussion of a proper evidentiary standard that it found no
reason to disagree with United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
823 (1976), which held that specific intent to relinquish citizenship must be proved by a clear and
convincing standard. 577 F.2d at 11.
84. See text accompanying notes 42-49 supra.
85. 577 F.2d at 11. The Seventh Circuit was referring to the 1961 amendment to the Act of
1952 which provided evidentiary standards of proof in expatriation cases.
86. Eg., United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976);
Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972).
87. 577 F.2d at I.
88. Id. at 12.
89. 444 U.S. at 258-63.
90. See text accompanying notes 53-61 supra.
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ruled Perez v. Brownell,91 and the holding in Perez that an individual
could be expatriated without regard to his intent to relinquish citizen-
ship. The Court added that in Afroyim it had emphasized that Con-
gress has no power, express or implied, to take away United States
citizenship without an individual's "assent." The Terrazas Court rea-
soned that it would be very difficult not to give "assent" to expatriation
essentially the same meaning as "intent" to relinquish citizenship.
92
Thus, the Court explained that the "will of the citizen rather than the
will of Congress and its assessment of his conduct" is necessary for
expatriation. 93
The Court next addressed the issue of whether Congress has the
power to determine the standards of evidentiary proof in expatriation
cases. In concluding that Congress has such power, the Court ex-
plained that Congress derives its power to prescribe rules of evidence
and standards of proof in the federal courts from the Constitution,
94
and that such power has often been recognized. 95 To further substanti-
ate its view, the Court reasoned that since Congress has the express
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment, it would be untenable to
hold that Congress has no power to determine the means of enforcing
the amendment.
96
Finally, the Court discussed the constitutional validity of the con-
gressional standards. It found both the statutory presumption of volun-
tariness and the preponderance of the evidence standard to be valid.
97
The Court found no reason to replace the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard contained in section 148 1(c) with the clear and convinc-
ing standard set forth in Nishikawa v. Dulles. It noted that in
Nishikawa the Court had acted without legislative guidance and that
the decision was not based on the Constitution.98 The Court also found
91. Perez sustained § 401(e) of the Act of 1940 which provided that a United States citizen
would lose his nationality by voting in a political election in a foreign state. See notes 26-38 supra
and accompanying text.
92. 444 U.S. at 260.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 266. The Court based its finding on U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9.
95. In support of its statement the Court cited Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S.
1, 31 (1976); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,
467 (1943).
96. 444 U.S. at 266.
97. Id. at 264-70.
98. The Court noted that Nishikawa did not rule on the constitutionality of the evidentiary
standards contained in § 148 1(c) since the standards were not enacted until after the decision was
published. 444 U.S. at 264-65.
The legislative history of the evidentiary amendment to the Act of 1952 states that the eviden-
tiary standards are designed to govern expatriation proceedings and are not intended to apply to
the standards in denaturalization decisions. The House Committee found it difficult to assent to
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that neither the citizenship clause99 nor the due process clause l0 ° invali-
dates the preponderance of the evidence standard in section 148 1(c). It
acknowledged that in criminal and involuntary commitment cases
where liberty interests are at stake, the due process clause requires
proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence, but explained that "ex-
patriation proceedings are civil in nature and do not threaten a loss of
liberty."'' Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the preponderance
of the evidence standard provides sufficient protection since the Gov-
ernment has the heavy burden of proving "intent" to renounce citizen-
ship.'0
2
Justices Marshall and Stevens dissented from the Court's conclu-
sion that the standard of evidentiary proof in expatriation proceedings
should be a preponderance of the evidence. 0 3 Justice Marshall stated
that the importance of United States citizenship deserved more empha-
sis by the Court and that expatriation proceedings do, in fact, threaten
a loss of liberty.' °4 As a result, he concluded that a requirement of
clear and convincing evidence is the necessary standard in determining
loss of citizenship. 0 5 Justice Stevens stated that the majority had too
the holdings in Gonzales v. Landon and Nishikawa v. Dulles where the Court applied the clear and
convincing standard, but the committee failed to explain its reasons for applying the lesser pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard in expatriation. See H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., Ist
Sess. 40, 41 reprintedin [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2984-85.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
101. 444 U.S. at 266.
102. Id. at 267. On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court specifically addressed
the issue of whether Terrazas intended to abandon his citizenship in addition to his committing an
expatriating act. Terrazas argued that his fight to retain his citizenship is evidence of a lack of
intention to relinquish citizenship, but the court stated that the relevant inquiry was Terrazas"
state of mind in 1970-71 rather than his struggle to retain citizenship. The court held that the
evidence supporting a finding of intent was nearly overwhelming and clearly met the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. Terrazas v. Muskie, 494 F. Supp. 1017, 1019-20 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
103. Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens each wrote an opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Stewart joined, wrote a dissenting opinion.
The opinions addressed various issues contained in the opinion of the majority. 444 U.S. at 270-
76. Since the focus of this comment is on the burden of proof in expatriation decisions, only those
portions of the opinions which relate to this issue are mentioned in the text.
104. Id. at 271. In support of his opinion, Justice Marshall cited a statement by Chief Justice
Warren in Trop v. Dulles, which articulated the lost rights of expatriates. Justice Warren stated:
[Tihe expatriate has lost the right to have rights. This punishment is offensive to cardinal
principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-
increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be established
against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and for what
cause his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to banish-
ment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored
in the international community of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the
disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person.
The threat makes the punishment obnoxious.
Id, citing 356 U.S. at 102.
105. 444 U.S. at 272.
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narrowly construed the meaning of liberty in holding that expatriation
proceedings do not result in the loss of liberty. 0 6 In his judgment, an
individual's interest in preserving his citizenship is an aspect of liberty
which cannot be deprived without due process, and due process re-




The most significant determination made by the Supreme Court in
Vance v. Terrazas was that "expatriation proceedings are civil in nature
and do not threaten a loss of liberty."' 0 8 By so concluding, the Court
never reached the question of whether a preponderance of the evidence
standard affords adequate due process to the citizen, since it is well
recognized that a court need not decide how much process is due unless
first there is found to be a liberty or property interest within the four-
teenth amendment's protection. 0 9 Unfortunately, neither the majority
nor the dissenters, who did perceive a liberty interest to be at stake,
provided any authority for their conclusions as to this issue. " 0
The identification of sources which give rise to a liberty interest
has been difficult for the Court."l One of the first definitions of what
constitutes a liberty interest was made in Meyer v. Nebraska,"12 where
the Court explained:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
106. Id. at 273.
107. Id. at 274. Justice Stevens reasoned that an individual's interest in retaining his citizen-
ship is comparable to an individual's interest in not being involuntarily confined indefinitely. Jus-
tice Stevens thus concluded that for the reasons expressed by the Supreme Court in Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), a civil commitment case where a clear and convincing standard was
held to be the necessary burden of proof, due process requires clear and convincing proof in
expatriation as well. See 441 U.S. at 425-27, 431-33.
108. 444 U.S. at 266.
109. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977); Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). The Court, however, in extraordinary circumstances has created
special exceptions to the rule that an individual must be afforded some kind of hearing before
being deprived of a protected interest. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (suspen-
sion of driver's license due to refusal to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest); Ewing v. Mytinger
& Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (multiple seizures of misbranded articles); Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (United States may collect taxes assessed against transferees of
corporate property); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (property suppos-
edly belonging to an enemy may be seized during time of war without a prior hearing).
110. See text accompanying notes 101-07 supra.
11. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 646-47 (10th ed. 1980).
112. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, es-
tablish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men." 
3
In Meyer, the Court held that interference with a teacher's right to
teach a foreign language and the right of parents to determine who
shall instruct their children and in what manner were restraints on lib-
erty. 114 Since Meyer, the Court also has found, among others, liberty
interests in the right to travel," 5 personal privacy, 16 freedom from civil
commitment 1 7 and freedom from punishment." 1
8
Freedom from punishment has been an identifiable and protected
liberty interest in a variety of contexts. In Ingraham v. Wright,'19 a
case involving corporal punishment in the public schools, the Court
found a liberty interest at stake. It reasoned that, "[a]mong the historic
liberties so protected was a right to be free from. . .unjustified intru-
sions on personal security. While the contours of this historic liberty
interest . . . have not been defined precisely, they always have been
thought to encompass freedom from . . . punishment."'
' 20
In the context of expatriation the spectre of punishment also has
been raised. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,' 2' a United States citi-
zen was expatriated for remaining outside of the United States for the
purpose of avoiding military service in violation of section 4010) of the
Act of 1940.122 The Court examined the provisions of the statute to
determine whether they were regulatory in nature or whether they were
punitive. After finding that throughout history forfeiture of citizenship
has been used as punishment and that the congressional purpose con-
clusively indicated that the provisions should be interpreted as puni-
tive, the Court concluded that section 4010) was punitive and,
therefore, could not constitutionally stand "lacking as [it does] the pro-
cedural safeguards of the Constitution."''
23
Since the assessment of particular procedural safeguards under the
113. Id. at 399.
114. Id. at 400-03.
115. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
116. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
117. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
118. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
119. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
120. Id. at 673-74.
121. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See also text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
122. Id. at 147-48. For the text of § 4010) of the Act of 1940 see note 27 supra.
123. 372 U.S. at 186.
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due process clause does not even arise unless there is a liberty interest
involved, Kennedy appears to stand for the proposition that freedom
from punishment gives rise to a liberty interest, given its statement that
procedural safeguards are required where punishment is the sanction
imposed under section 4010) of the Act of 1940. The precise meaning
of the Court's holding, however, is not clear. It is uncertain from the
language in Kennedy whether the decision establishes that freedom
from punishment generally gives rise to a liberty interest or that a lib-
erty interest is involved solely where expatriation under section 4010) is
the form of punishment being imposed.
The broader interpretation of Kennedy, however, was firmly estab-
lished by the Court in Bell v. Wolfish. 124 Although Bell involved pun-
ishment of pre-trial detainees, 125 the Court specifically cited and relied
on Kennedy for the proposition that punitive measures may not be con-
stitutionally imposed without due process of law. The Court recited the
factual setting of Kennedy and depicted the holding in Kennedy as ap-
plying to expatriation in general. Referring to Kennedy, the Court in
Bell remarked that, because forfeiture of citizenship "traditionally had
been considered punishment and the legislative history of the forfeiture
provisions 'conclusively' showed that the measure was intended to be
punitive, the Court [in Kennedy] held that forfeiture of citizenship in
such circumstances constituted punishment that could not constitution-
ally be imposed without due process of law."' 26 Thus, on the basis of
the Bell Court's application of Kennedy, there is no reason to limit the
Kennedy holding solely to section 401(j) of the Act of 1940.
The Court in Terrazas failed to consider the standards set forth in
Kennedy and authoritatively interpreted in Bell. The Court should
have recognized that expatriation proceedings do threaten a loss of lib-
erty 127 and, therefore, ought to have reached the question of how much
124. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
125. Id. at 535. Justice Stevens dissented in Bell, but supported the majority's finding of a
liberty interest. Justice Stevens noted the majority's divergence from its prior line of case law by
explaining that the right to be free from punishment is neither expressly contained within the
provisions of the Bill of Rights nor within any statute. He further pointed out that the source of
the freedom "is the word 'liberty' itself as used in the Due Process Clause, and as informed by
'history, reason, the past course of decisions,' and the judgment and experience of 'those whom the
Constitution entrusted' with interpreting the word." Id. at 580, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1950). The majority responded to Justice Stevens'
comment in a footnote, stating that its holding was, in fact, based on prior decisional law. The
Court cited two cases, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), and Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228 (1896), for the proposition that a liberty interest is implicated where there is a finding
of punishment. 441 U.S. at 535-36 n.17.
126. Id. at 538.




The resolution of what process is due "is not a technical concep-
tion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circum-
stances,"'' 28 but is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands."'' 2 9 Generally, the courts balance the
interests of the individual against that of the government in determin-
ing what process is due. In a leading decision, Mathews v. Eldridge,
130
the Court enumerated a balancing test utilizing three distinct factors
which had been identified in prior due process decisions as important
elements for determining the specific dictates of due process.' 3' Ac-
cording to Mathews, the courts must consider the private interest that
will be affected; second, they must consider the risk of erroneous depri-
vation of the private interest through the procedures, and the probable
value of the substituted procedural safeguards; and, finally, the courts
must look at the interest of the government, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens required by the sub-
stituted procedural requirements.'
32
The procedural due process question presented in Terrazas is
whether a preponderance of the evidence standard affords adequate
due process or whether a clear and convincing standard is required.
The latter is an intermediate standard between preponderance of the
evidence and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 133 Civil cases in-
volving allegations of moral turpitude often use a clear and convincing
standard. 134 Similarly, the courts apply this heavier burden where the
restraint and corporal punishment provide a sufficient level of punishment to implicate a four-
teenth amendment liberty interest, there is a de minimus level of imposition with which the Con-
stitution is not concerned. Id. at 674. It would appear that loss of citizenship in expatriation
decisions provides a sufficient level of punishment to implicate a liberty interest in view of the
importance the Court has continually placed on citizenship. See text accompanying notes 140-48
infra.
128. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1950).
129. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
130. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
131. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-68 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-66 (1970); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
132. 424 U.S. at 335.
133. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1978).
134. See, e.g., Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676 (1979) (fraud); Lumpkins v. McPhee, 59 N.M.
442, 286 P.2d 299 (1955) (fraud); Cheesman v. Sathre, 45 Wash. 2d 193, 273 P.2d 500 (1954)
(conspiracy). For a discussion of the use of clear and convincing proof, see 30 AM. JUR. 2d Evi-
dence § 1167 (1967).
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consequences of the government action are great and where important
individual interests are at stake. 35 For example, the individual interest
involved in the outcome of an involuntary civil commitment proceed-
ing requires clear and convincing proof.' 36 The standard also is ap-
plied in denaturalization137 and deportation cases 38 where loss of
citizenship and expulsion from the United States are considered to
present unusually drastic consequences for the individual.
139
In using the Mathews balancing test as a guide to determine what
process is due in Terrazas, the first consideration is the individual inter-
est in citizenship. The Supreme Court has continually emphasized the
significance of the citizenship interest in expatriation' 4° and denaturali-
zation decisions.' 4' Although denaturalization and expatriation deci-
sions differ in some respects,' 42 the individual interest to be protected in
135. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1978).
136. Id. at 427.
137. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660
(1958); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
138. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
139. 1d. at 285; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (1943). The Court in
Woodby explained:
[Ilt does not syllogistically follow that a person may be banished from this country upon
no higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case. This Court has not closed its
eyes to the drastic deprivations that may follow when a resident of this country is com-
pelled by our Government to forsake all bonds formed here and go to a foreign land
where he often has no contemporary identification.
...The immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that inflicted by
denaturalization, which does not, immediately at least, result in expulsion from our
shores.
385 U.S. at 285-86.
140. In his Perez v. Brownell dissent, which later became the majority view in Afroyim v. Rusk,
Chief Justice Warren wrote, "Iclitizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right
to have rights. Remove this priceless possession and there remains a stateless person, disgraced
and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen." 356 U.S. at 64 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original). Likewise in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Court expressed a view that citizen-
ship rights are one of the most valuable rights in the world today and recognized that a person
who loses his nationality possesses no protection whatsoever and has no means of redress against
the state. 372 U.S. at 160. The Supreme Court also expressed an interest in citizenship rights in
Afroyim. The Court stated that its holding gives citizens that which is their own-"a constitu-
tional right to remain a citizen in a free country. ... 387 U.S. at 268.
141. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350
(1960); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 645 (1946) (see note 147 infra); Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (see text accompanying notes 145-47 infra).
In Costello the Court stated, "[s]evere consequences may attend its loss [citizenship], aggra-
vated when the person has enjoyed his citizenship for many years." 365 U.S. at 269-70. Similarly,
in Chaunt the Court noted, "in view of the grave consequences to the citizen, naturalization de-
crees are not lightly to be set aside. . . . [Tihe issue in these cases is so important to the liberty of
the citizen that the weight normally given concurrent findings of the lower court does not preclude
reconsideration here .... " 364 U.S. at 353 (citations omitted).
142. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1976) with 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976). Expatriation denotes an
individual's voluntary renunciation of his citizenship or nationality whereas denaturalization de-
notes government withdrawal of a naturalized citizen's citizenship. Denaturalization proceedings
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both is the same. It was the importance of protecting citizenship that
led the Supreme Court in Schneiderman v. United States, 43 to hold that
the burden of proof in denaturalization cases must be "clear and con-
vincing."' " Schneiderman found that the consequences of depriving
an individual of citizenship rights is "more serious than the taking of
one's property or the imposition of a fine or other penalty."'' 45 It added
that its value and importance would be difficult to exaggerate and that
it may be "regarded as the highest hope of civilized man."'146 The
Court feared that if a lesser standard were applied, the security of the
status of naturalized United States citizens might depend on the "politi-
cal temper of majority thought and the stresses of the times." 147 Since
Schneiderman, the Court has continually applied that standard in de-
naturalization decisions.
48
The expatriation and denaturalization decisions illustrate the im-
portance the Court has placed on citizenship rights. The private inter-
est in citizenship is substantial and weighs heavily in favor of the
individual.
The second factor of the Mathews test involves a consideration of
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest under a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard and the probable value of the clear
and convincing standard. In Addington v. Texas, 149 where an individ-
ual was involuntarily committed to a state mental hospital, the Court
applied Mathews to determine whether the clear and convincing stan-
dard or the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate.
The Court explained that the preponderance of the evidence standard
is used in civil cases which may typically involve a monetary dispute
involve the process of revoking and setting aside the order admitting a person to citizenship and
cancelling the Certificate of Naturalization. Such action is taken on the ground that the order and
certificate were illegally procured or were procured by misrepresentation, on the ground that a
person within five years of naturalization became affiliated with an organization which at the time
of naturalization would have precluded the individual from naturalization, and on the ground
that a person within five years of naturalization takes up permanent residence in another country.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976).
143. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
144. Id. at 123.
145. Id. at 122.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 159. Also, in Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 645 (1946), another denaturaliza-
tion case upholding a clear and convincing standard, the Court noted that citizenship rights are
important in that they carry with them the privilege to participate in the affairs of society, the right
to speak freely, to criticize government officers and to promote changes in the law. Id. at 658.
148. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350
(1960); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665
(1944).
149. 441 U.S. 418 (1978).
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between private litigants. 150 It added that society places a minimal
concern on the outcome of such suits and that as a result the plaintifis
burden is a mere preponderance of the evidence.'51 The Court further
noted that with this standard, the parties share the risk of error in
nearly equal fashion.' 52 The Addington Court explained that the inter-
ests at stake when a clear and convincing standard is used are much
more substantial than when a preponderance of the evidence standard
is used and that the risk to the defendant of an erroneous charge is
reduced by increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof.
53
In the context of expatriation, the use of the clear and convincing
standard reduces the risk of erroneous deprivation of citizenship by in-
creasing the government's burden of proof. Moreover, the increased
burden impresses the factfinder with the importance of the decision,
thereby reducing the chances of error. 154 Admittedly, the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard promulgated by Congress was not in-
tended by Congress or by the Supreme Court to stand alone. Congress
added a rebuttable presumption that the expatriating act was commit-
ted voluntarily and the Supreme Court held that, in light of the con-
gressional standards, a court must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the individual has "intentionally" expatriated himself.
While the Court in Terrazas found that the infusion of an "intent" ele-
ment provided sufficient protection to the individual, it is doubtful that
the risk of erroneous deprivation is thereby sufficiently reduced. A pre-
sumption of voluntariness places a greater burden on the citizen to pre-
serve his citizenship than on the government attempting to impose
expatriation. Furthermore, although the "intent" element reduces the
risk of erroneous deprivation by requiring proof of intent to commit an
expatriating act, the risk of error is still great where that element, also,
need be proved by no more thah a mere preponderance of the evidence.
The final factor of the Mathews test is the interest of the govern-
ment. The primary governmental interest in the application of eviden-
tiary standards in expatriation proceedings is avoiding potential
embarrassment in foreign affairs. 155 The majority in Perez v. Brownell
150. Id. at 423.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 424.
154. Id. at 427.
155. The obvious result of using a clear and convincing standard is that the government will
find it more difficult to expatriate citizens who have become involved in the types of activities
listed as expatriating actions in the Act of 1952. For example, a citizen has less fear of expatria-
tion if he serves in foreign armed forces, votes in a political election in a foreign state, commits an
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first discussed the interest of the government in avoiding embarrass-
ment in foreign affairs in conjunction with the power of Congress to
deal with such matters. The Court reasoned that the "activities of citi-
zens of one nation when in another country can easily cause serious
embarrassment to the government of their own country as well as their
fellow citizens." 56 The Perez Court feared that if a citizen participated
in political or governmental affairs of another country, such activities
might jeopardize the successful conduct of America's international re-
lations. Further, there was concern that a citizen may promote "con-
duct contrary to the interest of his own government" or that the people
or government of the foreign country may look upon the citizen's activ-
ities as the action of the United States government or as a reflection of
its policy. 157
More recently, following the Afroyim v. Rusk holding that citizen-
ship cannot be taken away without an individual's "assent," a similar
concern was expressed by at least one commentator. 58 He conjectured
that as a result ofAfroyim, which makes it harder for the government
to expatriate its citizens, it would be more difficult to deter citizens
from serving as "volunteers" in the Israeli armed forces. These volun-
teers potentially could anger the Arab states, thereby further aggravat-
ing Middle East tensions and interfering with United States peace
efforts. 159
Although it is possible that the use of a clear and convincing stan-
dard in expatriation proceedings may occasionally create an embar-
rassing situation for the United States, this interest does not appear as
significant as protecting the citizenship rights of United States citizens.
It is unlikely that the actions of citizens abroad will be taken seriously
by foreign governments as a reflection of United States foreign policy.
In addition, once a citizen is expatriated he is left with no alternative
remedy. The government, on the other hand, through its political
processes, is capable of dealing with its potential embarrassment. Fis-
cally and administratively, the only significant additional burden on
the government is a requirement to present a stronger case against the
citizen. '
60
act of treason, performs duties or employment in a foreign government or becomes naturalized or
takes an oath of allegiance in a foreign state.
156. 356 U.S. at 59.
157. Id.
158. Dionisopoulus, Afroyim P. Rusk: The Evolution, Uncertainty and Implications of a Consti-
tutionalPrinciple, 55 MINN. L. REV. 235, 254-56 (1970).
159. Id.
160. In addition, the interest of the government in avoiding embarrassment in foreign affairs
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While the Mathews test is a subjective way of determining what
process is due, it at least allows the courts to look at the particular cir-
cumstances of each case and weigh the specific interests involved. In
expatriation cases, a clear and convincing standard should be required,
in order to afford adequate due process to the citizen. The interest in
preserving citizenship rights should weigh more heavily than the gov-
ernment's apprehension of potential embarrassment in foreign affairs.
The clear and convincing standard would reduce the risk of erroneous
deprivation of an individual's citizenship, a right which has long been
recognized as one of man's most cherished rights.
CONCLUSION
In Vance v. Terrazas, the Supreme Court for the first time re-
viewed the constitutionality of the statute establishing the necessary
burden of proof in expatriation cases. In upholding the preponderance
of the evidence standard, the Court erroneously refused to recognize a
liberty interest in citizenship. As a result, the Court never reached the
question of how much process was due in Terrazas. There is indeed a
liberty interest at stake in citizenship and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that the Government establish expatri-
ation by clear and convincing evidence, not merely by a preponderance
of the evidence. This result is necessary in view of the crucial impor-
tance of maintaining citizenship rights.
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